This book examines the roots and elements of the research and knowledge-generation problems in US intelligence.

The work identifies the crux of the problem as the lack of a research capability in US intelligence, which has developed over the past 40 years due to a variety of organizational decisions that prioritized current intelligence reporting and a focus on structural solutions to fix intelligence failures. The book argues that this is the principal cause of recent major intelligence failures regarding 9/11, the 2003 Iraq War, and the current Russia-Ukraine War. Throughout the book, the authors aim to provide short-, medium-, and long-term, policy-relevant recommendations to intelligence officials and members of the US Congress, in the form of workforce, leadership, and organizational changes that can be implemented to address existing research shortcomings in intelligence analysis. The book's conclusions will also be relevant to the intelligence agencies of other countries.

This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, national security, US politics, defense studies, and international relations.