Folk Psychology Has Good Predictive and Explanatory Power (and So is the Best Hypothesis) -- Thinking harder: the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting -- Key points: eliminative materialism -- C. Philosophical behaviourism -- Hempel's 'hard' behaviourism -- Ryle's 'soft' behaviourism -- Dispositions -- Thinking and Other Mental Processes -- Thinking harder: a note on physicalism and the category mistake -- Issues -- Dualist Arguments -- Issues Defining Mental States Satisfactorily -- The Asymmetry between Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Other People's Mental States -- Thinking harder: Ryle on consciousness -- The Distinctness of Mental States from Behaviour -- Key points: philosophical behaviourism -- Summary: physicalist theories -- IV. Functionalism -- What is a function? -- Causal Role Functionalism -- Thinking harder: a computational notion of function -- Functionalism and behaviourism -- Functionalism and multiple realisability -- Inner States -- Multiple Realisability -- Issues -- The Possibility of a Functional Duplicate with Different Qualia (Inverted Qualia) -- Thinking harder: Patricia Churchland on inverted qualia -- Block on the Possibility of a Functional Duplicate with No Qualia -- Thinking harder: Chalmers on explaining consciousness -- Key points: functionalism -- Summary: functionalism -- V. Dualist theories: property dualism -- A. Property dualism -- The theory -- The knowledge argument -- The Knowledge Argument as a Dualist Argument against Other Theories -- Responses to the knowledge argument -- Mary Does Not Gain New Propositional Knowledge, but Does Gainability Knowledge -- Mary Does Not Gain New Propositional Knowledge, but Does Gain Acquaintance Knowledge -- Thinking harder: Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way