"Cyber persistence theory introduces a new logic and lexicon aligned to the empirical experience of cyber activity in international relations. The reality of State behavior and interaction in cyberspace has been quite different from the model of war and coercion upon which many countries base their cyber strategies. This unexpected reality has developed because security in and through cyberspace rests on a distinct set of features that differ from the dominant security paradigms associated with nuclear and conventional weapons environments. Cyber persistence theory posits the existence of a distinct strategic environment based on the logic of exploitation rather than coercion. To achieve security in this cyber strategic environment, States must engage in initiative persistence, continuously setting and maintaining the conditions of security in their favour. The theory introduces the key concept of the cyber fait accompli and addresses the potential for cyber stability through a tacit bargaining process. The book provides empirical evidence of strategic cyber campaigning and details how the cyber strategic environment can impact State behaviour with a case study of the United States. The cyber strategic environment requires its own theory to achieve security. Whereas security requires States to triumph in war in the conventional environment and avoid war in the nuclear environment, States in the cyber strategic environment may have a true alternative to war in order to achieve strategically relevant outcomes. Understanding how States will leverage that alternative is the central question of early 21st century international security"--