Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Map: Nationalist-Held Offshore Islands, 1954-1955 -- Abbreviations -- I. The Analytical Framework -- A. The Lack of Direct Communication -- B.A Note on the Non-Use of Terms Like "Quemoy-Matsu Crisis"--C. Three Models for Analyzing Foreign Policy -- D. Some Maoist Principles of Conflict Management -- E. Rational Policy and the U.S. Government -- Notes -- II. The Context of Events -- A. The Foreign Policy of the PRC -- B. The Domestic Policy of the PRC -- C. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union -- D. The Foreign Policy of the United States -- E. Origins of the Mutual Defense Treaty -- Notes -- III. Propaganda and Action -- A. Beginning of the "Liberate Taiwan" Campaign -- B. The Shelling of Quemoy -- C. End of the Quemoy Phase -- Notes -- IV. The Mutual Defense Treaty -- A. Dulles Negotiates the MDT -- B. Implications of the Treaty -- C. The Threat of an American-Supported Invasion -- D. Peking's Demand for the Withdrawal of American Forces From the Area of Taiwan -- Notes -- V. Climax of the 1954-55 Taiwan Affair -- A. Assault on Yikiangshan -- B. Formosa Resolution -- C. Taipei Presses for a Public U.S. Commitment to Quemoy-Matsu -- D. United Nations Demarches -- E. Evacuation of the Tachens -- Notes -- VI. Continuing Confrontation -- A. Nationalist Policy on the Offshores -- B. PRC Policy on Quemoy and Matsu -- C. The Contradictory Fears of America's Allies -- D. United States Policy on Quemoy and Matsu -- E. United States Threats -- Notes -- VII. Movement Toward Negotiation -- A. Overtures and Diplomatic Fencing -- B. The PRC Changes Tactics -- C. Easing of Tension -- D. The Robertson-Radford Mission -- E. Bandung -- F. The End of the Affair (Until 1958) -- Notes -- VIII. Sequels -- A. Negotiations Deadlock -- B. The Taiwan Affair of 1958